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NOTES
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT AS BARRING
SUIT UNDER SECTION 2679 OF THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
THE PROBLEM
A perplexing problem-concerning the right of an injured federal
employee to collect compensation from the United States and subsequently
to attempt to increase his recovery by a civil suit against the United
States-confronts the federal courts in situations typified by the follow-
ing hypothetical.
X, an employee of the United States Government, acting within the
scope of his employment becomes involved in an accident caused by the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle driven by Y. X receives benefits
under the Federal Employees Compensation Act,' and institutes a tort
proceeding in a state court against Y for damages resulting from the ac-
cident. Y, also a federal employee, was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment at the time of the accident.
The Government, pursuant to, the provisions of section 2679 of the
Federal Tort Claims Act,2 removes the action to a federal district court
and replaces Y as the defendant. Following removal, the Government
files a motion for summary judgment relying on a provision of the Com-
pensation Act.' The relevant provision provides that the remedy against
the United States afforded by the Compensation Act is exclusive as to an
injured federal employee.'
This note examines the remedial law available to injured federal em-
ployees, particularly with reference to the interaction and relationship of
the Federal Tort Claims Act5 and the Compensation Act.
The 1961 amendment to the Tort Claims Act, applicable to accidents
involving federal employees operating motor vehicles within the scope
of their employment, provides:
(a). The remedy by suit against the United States as provided
1. Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 742 (1916), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 751-95 (1964).
2. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346-2680 (1964).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 757 (1964).
4. See notes 9-12 infra and accompanying text.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1964).
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by section 1346(b) 6 of this title for damages . . . resulting
from the operation by any employee of the Government of any
motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action
or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the
employee...
(d). Upon certification by the Attorney General . . . any such
civil action . . . shall be removed . . . to the district court
. . . and the proceedings deemed a tort action brought against
the United States.7
The effect of this section is that the liability of the United States is
substituted for that of an employee who caused the injuries.'
The effect intended by the amendment to the Compensation Act is
noted in subsection "b."9
The liability of the United States . . with respect to injury
or death of an employee shall be exclusive and in place, of all
other liability of the United States . . . under any Federal
tort liability statute. . .. "
The Tort Claims Act amendment has been held to abrogate a claim-
ant's common-law remedy against an employee driver by substituting a
new remedy against the United States." In situations involving an in-
jured federal employee, however, the Compensation Act expressly pro-
vides that the compensation remedy shall be the exclusive remedy against
the Government--exclusive of "any Federal tort liability statute."'1 2 The
combined effect is to deny a federal employee's common-law right to re-
cover for injuries sustained in situations to which the Tort Claims
Act amendment is applicable.
Only one litigated case has presented the problem of an attempted
claim against the United States under section 2679 by a federal employee
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), is a statement of liability of the United States for
injury resulting from the negligence of any of its employees.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1964).
8. Reynaud v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 945 (D. Mo. 1966) ; Gustafson v. Peck,
216 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. Iowa 1965).
9. Prior to the adoption of section 757(b), section 757(a) standing by itself indi-
cated that the Compensation Act was to be "exclusive." Section 757(a) reads:
As long as the employee is in receipt of compensation . . . or, if he had been
paid in a lump sum . . . he shall not receive from the United States any salary,
pay or remuneration whatsoever except in return for services actually per-
formed. ...
5 U.S.C. § 757(a) (1964).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
11. Gustafson v. Peck, 216 F. Supp. 320, 322 (D. Iowa 1965).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1967], Art. 17
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol2/iss1/17
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
covered by the Compensation Act.' In Green v. Short,' the district
court overruled the Government's motion for summary judgment and
entered a judgment for the plaintiff. 5 The plaintiff had been injured
while riding as a passenger in defendant's automobile. The accident
allegedly resulted from the defendant's negligence. Plaintiff initiated the
action against the driver of the automobile, but the United States was
substituted for the defendant according to the procedure outlined in
the Tort Claims Act.
16
In an oral opinion, Judge MacSwinford in imposing a double liabil-
ity stated:
I hold that Miss Green did have a common law right of action
against Mr. Short for injuries. After she sued in state court,
the United States supplanted itself as defendant to discharge
its obligation to him. The United States can not then claim
that the plaintiff has no right of action. She is entitled to judg-
ment against him and the Compensation law does not preclude
this.' 7
As noted in the above language, the court disbelieved that Congress
intended to abrogate the common-law right available to a federal em-
ployee injured by the negligent driving of a co-employee.
CONGESSIONAL INTENT IN ADOPTING 28 U.S.C. § 2679 AND 5 U.S.C. §
757
Any attempt to resolve an apparent statutory conflict begins with an
analysis of a legislature's intent in enacting the particular legislation. 8
The Tort Claims Act has been hailed as a landmark waiver of
sovereign immunity, a doctrine which had prevented recovery by many
claimants.' 9 This generalization of the act's nature is unjustified in
light of the limited purposes which compelled its adoption. For the Tort
Claims Act was a means by which Congress sought to relieve its annual
13. See Cox v. Maddox, 255 F. Supp. 517 (D. Ark. 1966). A third-party complaint
for contribution was disallowed. The court reasoned that under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1958)
the injured party had no remedy against the federally-employed driver, but the plaintiff
being a member of the military has no relief against the Government.
14. Civil No. 1107, E.D. Ky., Feb. 11, 1965.
15. The court expressly provided that the judgment for $15,000.00 was not to be
reduced by any compensation which the Government had already paid to the plaintiff.
16. Record, vol. 1, pp. 1-5.
17. Judge MacSwinford gave no written opinion. The quotation is excerpted from
the transcript of his oral remarks.
18. See generally NUTTING & ELLIOTT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
§ 15 (3d ed. 1964).
19. Dalhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 18 (1953).
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burden of dealing with the numerous private claim bills that were intro-
duced each session.20  The act was proposed under the title: "More Ef-
ficient Use of Congressional Time."' The Committee on the Reorgani-
zation of Congress, in recommending the act stated:
Congress is poorly equipped to serve as a judicial tribunal for
the settlement of private claims against the United States ...
We, therefore, recommend that all claims against the Govern-
ment be transferred by law to the . . . U. S. district courts for
proper adjudication.22
Tort Claims Act Amendment in 1961
During the debate in the Senate on the Tort Claims Act amendment,
the reasons favoring adoption were forceably presented.2" Senator Ken-
neth Keating summed up the arguments by noting that the amendment
was intended to relieve a federal employee (whose duties included the
operation of motor vehicles) of the burden imposed by the constant ex-
posure to liability for negligence.2" The continuing threat of liability
had the effect of forcing many federal employees to purchase liability
insurance, thereby placing a severe burden upon their "already small
salaries."2  The framers of the amendment, therefore, intended the Tort
Claims Act remedy to be exclusive of any other remedy against the
employee.26
The 86th Congress enacted similar legislation" which President
20. Private claim bills are congressional response to claims which private parties
have been unable to prosecute through administrative or judicial channels. Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort-A Proposed Statutory Reform, 11 A.B.A.J. 495,
497 (1945). Successful private claim bills result in either a direct appropriation or a
referral of the claim to the courts. The magnitude of this congressional problem is
shown by the words of the Senate Committee on the Reorganization of Congress:
In the 68th Congress about 2200 private claim bills were introduced. . . . In
the 70th Congress 2268 private claim bills were introduced. . . . In each of the
74th and 75th Congresses over 2300 private claim bills were introduced, seek-
ing more than $100,000,000.
S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1946).
21. S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
22. Id.
23. 107 CONG. REc. 18499 (1961) (remarks of Senator Keating).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. As precedents for its action Congress cited the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46
U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964), and 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1964). Section 745 of the Admiralty Act
is applicable and reads:
That where a remedy is provided by this chapter it shall hereafter be
exclusive of any other action by reason of the same subject matter against the
agent or employee of the United States . . . whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim.
The Admiralty Act is discussed infra at notes 69-84 and accompanying text.
27. 107 CONG. REC. 18500 (1961) (remarks of several senators).
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Eisenhower subsequently vetoed" containing a provision predicating re-
moval to a federal district court on the plaintiff's consent. The provi-
sion for making the procedure operative only at the election of the plain-
tiff defeated the purpose of the amendment.2"
The actual House committee recommendation also required the con-
sent of the plaintiff."0 Congress rejected this provision because it left
possible liability on the employee-driver when the plaintiff elected to sue
him instead of the Government. 1 The final version was the result of a
compromise between those primarily interested in completely removing
the possibility of liability and those who wished to protect the plaintiff
from improper removal of his action.2 As enacted, therefore, the Tort
Claims Act amendment was intended to abolish the burden that had been
shouldered by operators of motor vehicles acting within the scope of
their federal employment.2
Compensation Act Amendment
The "exclusive" amendment to the Compensation Act was adopted
to remedy a specific evil. 4 The Compensation Act, due to enactment of
various general liability -statutes, lost its position as the sole source of
governmental liability." Federal employees claimed that the general
statutes covered them, and they attempted to sue the United States for
injuries received in the course of their employment.8 6 The "exclusive"
amendment made clear that the general liability statutes were not intended
to apply to federal employees.2 Congress felt that the Compensation Act
provided adequate relief and that "to permit other remedies by suit
would . . . be unnecessary." '
Congress enacted the Compensation Act amendment in 1949, prior
to enacting the Tort Claims Act amendment in 1961. The House in
1949, therefore, could not have forseen the ramifications of the Com-
28. Id.
29. The final form was not the only proposal which was considered. The others
included: 1) that the Government would provide indemnity for the damages that the
driver had been forced to pay; and 2) that the Government purchase insurance for the
drivers. S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
30. H. R. REP. No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961). "It [the Committee] has
been concerned, however, with the effect of the bill upon the rights of an individual
plaintiff to maintain an action in a State court if he so desires." Id.
31. 107 CoNG. REC. 18500 (1961) (remarks of several senators).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. H.R. REP. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See generally S. REP. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1949).
38. H.R. REP. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1949).
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pensation Act amendment on the subsequent amendment to the Tort
Claims Act. The Compensation Act amendment was, however, passed to
remedy precisely the problem of the attempted claim under general li-
ability statutes by claimant-employees already covered by the Compensa-
tion Act.
In sum, congressional debate over the amendments to the Tort
Claims Act and the Compensation Act reveal no express legislative
opinion upon the precise problem of the extent of remedies available to a
federal employee injured by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by
another federal employee. The debates do, however, support the proposi-
tion that Congress did not intend to subject the United States to double
liability.
THE FERES DOCTRINE
In 1950, a plaintiff sued the United States for the wrongful death
of her husband, a soldier who had been injured while on active military
duty. 9 The plaintiff alleged that the United States quartered her hus-
band in barracks with an unsafe heating system. A resulting fire al-
legedly caused the death of her husband."'
Ultimately the case reached the Supreme Court which considered
the issue: "Whether the Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sus-
taining 'incident to the service' what under other circumstances would
be an actionable wrong." 1  Because the case involved the death of a
member of the armed forces whose widow alleged negligence by his su-
perior officers, other issues were present in addition to the federal-
employee-remedial law issue.42 The Court, however, did consider the
system of compensation available to servicemen and its effect upon the
applicability of the Tort Claims Act, stating that the purpose of the Tort
Claims Act was to provide a remedy where none had previously existed.4"
This premise led the Court to conclude that any apparent creation of a
"double remedy" by the provisions of the act would seem to be un-
intentional." This ruling is called the Feres rule. The duty of the
Court, as expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson, is to fit the new act "into the
39. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
40. Id. at 138.
41. Id.
42. The other issues were: 1) the absence of parallel liability on the part of an
individual since the Tort Claims Act provides for liability as if the Government were a
private party, 2) the dearth of private claims bills presented by the military, 3) the
"distinctly federal relationship" between military and the Government, and 4) the varia-
tions between the laws of the various states to which the military man would be sub-
jected without choice.
43. 340 U.S. at 140.
44. Id.
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entire statutory system of remedies against the Government to make a
workable, consistent and equitable whole."" The Court believed that if
Congress had intended a double remedy, it would have specifically said
so and would have adjusted the two remedies accordingly." The failure
to make such adjustment seemed indicative of a congressional unaware-
ness that such an interpretation was possible."
The Feres rule has been followed by a majority of courts which
have had to confront the question of the effect of a compensation sys-
tem.4" The first of the decisions applying Feres occurred two years after
the Supreme Court's initial decision-the problem arising from an ap-
parent overlapping of remedies provided by the Federal Employees Com-
pensation Act and the Public Vessels Act.4" The operative facts occurred
after enactment of the "exclusive" amendment to the Compensation Act,
but the Court did not consider the amendment controlling because Con-
gress had expressly excluded maritime plaintiffs from the scope of the
act.5°
Johansen v. United States" involved a carpenter who lacerated his
leg while working aboard a United States vessel.52 The Employees Com-
pensation Commission granted him benefits under the Federal Employees
Compensation Act. The carpenter then attempted to sue the United
States for damages under the Public Vessels Act of 1925." 3 The ma-
45. Id. at 139.
46. Id.
47. The Court mentioned that Feres was the "wholly different" question reserved
from their decision in Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1948). The Brooks case
dealt with two soldiers on furlough. There the Court held that the suit by the soldiers
was not barred by a compensation act which did not provide for exclusiveness or for
an election of remedies.
When compared to the Feres case, the Brooks decision creates a dividing line as to
the exclusiveness of the compensation remedy. This dividing line is based upon a de-
termination of whether the injuries are incurred "incident to service." If they are
incurred incident to service, Feres applies to make the compensation act the exclusive
remedy. If not, Brooks applies.
48, The line of cases following the Brooks decision seems to be the only exception
to the general trend. E.g., United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961) and
Wham v. United States, 180 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
49. Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 781-99 (1964).
50. 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) provides: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be con-
strued to affect any maritime rights and remedies of a master or member of the crew
of any vessel."
51. 343 U.S. 427 (1951).
52. Id. at 429.
53. The history of the Public Vessels Act is itself interesting. There has been a
considerable amount of litigation over the definition of the term "damages caused by a
public vessel," with a resulting broadening of the phrase. American Stevedores Inc. v.
Porello, 330 U.S. 446 (1947), held that the phrase covered personal injuries. Canadian
Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945), held that injuries resulting from a
navy escort negligently leading a vessel over a sunken craft was included within this
term.
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jority of the Supreme Court held that the presence of the Compensation
Act barred the suit under the Public Vessels Act.5"
The dissenting opinion, written by Mr. Justice Black, noted that the
class of employees to which the plaintiff belonged was expressly excluded
from the effects of the exclusive amendment to the Compensation Act.15
The dissenting justice cited the congressional debate concerning exclu-
sion of maritime employees,"6 arguing that the debate evidenced the con-
gressional intent that the remedy be available to maritime employees and
that such remedy should not be removed without allowing the maritime
employees a chance to be heard at committee hearings."
To Mr. Justice Black, precedent indicated that the plaintiff could
elect a remedy.5" This option should not, Mr. Justice Black argued, be
altered by judicial opinion where Congress had expressly refused to
alter the available remedy.5
The majority, however, stated that the legislative history of acts
such as the Public Vessels Act evidenced a disdaining of sovereign armor;
that these enactments "were not usually directed toward cases where the
United States had already put aside its sovereign armor, granting relief
in other forms.""0  The Court thus hesitated to adopt the literal words
of the statute which would create this double remedy.61
The Court next reviewed the congressional hearings on the Compen-
sation Act amendment.62 The majority, unlike the dissent, felt that the
conclusion to be drawn from these reports was that Congress had not ex-
pressly excluded federal employees from coverage of the Public Vessels
Act.65 The Court proceeded to analyze the various statutory remedies
available to seamen as well as federal and private employees for damages
normally within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal district court."
As a result of the preceding analysis, the Court reached the conclusion
54. 343 U.S. at 427.
55. Id. at 443.
56. The principle statement cited was by Senator Morse:
Under existing law, Government-employed seamen have been accorded rights
against the United States under the Suits in Admiralty Act. . . . I feel that they
should not be deprived of the benefits they have enjoyed for so many years
without having their arguments carefully considered.
95 CONG. REc. 13608 (1949).
57. 343 U.S. at 443.
58. Id. at 442.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 430.
61. Id. at 431.
62. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
63. 343 U.S. at 438.
64. Id.
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that none of the seamen could recover under more than one remedy."9
Citing the Feres rule,66 the Court concluded that employees entitled to
compensation benefits could not bring suit under the Public Vessels Act."
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE SUITS IN ADMIRALTY ACT AND
THE COMPENSATION ACT
In adopting the Tort Claims Act amendment Congress cited the
Suits in Admiralty Act 6 as precedent for making the liability of the
United States exclusive of any liability of the federal employee who
caused the injury. 9 Section 5 of the Suits in Admiralty Act"0 provides
that the remedy by suit against the United States with respect to vessels
or cargoes owned, operated or possessed by the United States shall be ex-
clusive of any remedy against the employee or agent whose act or onis-
sion caused the injury." Unlike the Tort Claims Act amendment dealing
with liability arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the Admiralty Act
makes no provision for the substitution of the United States as defendant
in actions erroneously brought against the employee." It merely provides
that such suits shall not lie against the employee.7"
Prior to adoption of the "exclusive" provision of the Admiralty Act,
there was confusion as to the responsibility for the torts of civil service
masters and seamen." This confusion induced the adoption of the "ex-
clusive" provision" in 1950.6 Thus, the federal employee, whose in-
juries were caused by a general agent of the United States and fell within
the provisions of the Admiralty Act, was restricted to his remedy against
the United States before the Compensation Act was expressly made
exclusive."
It should be pointed out that the "exclusive" amendment to the Com-
pensation Act contained a proviso which excluded maritime plaintiffs
from its operation."8  The unanswered question remained-whether the
65. Id. at 441.
66. Id. at 432.
67. Id. at 441.
68. See note 24 supra.
69. Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1964).
70. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964).
71. Id.
72. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
73. See note 24 supra.
74. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949). See also
Caldora v. Eckert, 332 U.S. 155 (1947) and Lustgarten v. United States Shipping
Emergency Fleet Co., 280 U.S. 320 (1930).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1292, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949).
76. Id.
77. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 50 supra.
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employee whose remedy was under the Admiralty Act would be further
restricted to his recovery under the Compensation Act.
In 1959, the Supreme Court reviewed a claim under the Suits in
Admiralty Act by a federal employee who was entitled to the benefits of
the Compensation Act."9 The employee attacked the ruling of the Court
in the Johansen case."° In a per curiam opinion, however, the Supreme
Court specifically refused to review Johansen." Instead, the Court held
that the considerations which led to the Johansen ruling were equally ap-
plicable to suits under the Admiralty Act. 2 Citing the Johansen opinion,
the Court said that the United States "has established by the Compensa-
tion Act a method of redress for its employees. There is no reason to
have two systems of redress."8 " Accordingly, the Court held that the
existence of the compensation system precluded suits against the Govern-
ment under the Admiralty Act.
8 4
THE FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES ACT
Until 1961, the Federal Prison Industries Act," which provided the
sole compensation remedy for federal prisoners, covered only those in-
mates injured while working for the Prison Industries Corporation. 6
Thus only twenty percent of federal prisoners were protected, and then
only during work hours." A 1961 amendment to the Federal Prison
Industries Act extended the benefits to "inmates or their dependents for
injuries suffered in any industry or in any work activity in connection
with the maintenance or operation of the institute where confined."8 8
Reportedly, the amendment extended coverage to about ninety percent of
the federal prisoners." Provisions of the Prison Industries Act and the
Federal Tort Claims Act have come in conflict in a number of cases.
79. Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959).
80. Id. at 496.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Federal Prison Industries Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121-28 (1964).
86. Prior to its amendment in 1961 section 4126 provided that the fund may be em-
ployed "in paying, under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General . ..
compensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry.
Federal Prison Industries Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 852 (1948).
87. 1957 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 409.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1964), now reads:
The corporation . . . is authorized to employ the fund . . . in paying compensa-
tion to inmates or their dependents for injuries suffered in any industry or in
any work activity in connection with the maintenance or operation of the institu-
tion where confined. ...
89. 1957 AT'VY GEN. ANN. REP. 409, 410.
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United States v. Muniz"° concerned a claim by an injured federal
prisoner who alleged that the Government was negligent in failing to pro-
vide proper supervision of the inmates and in failing to stop twelve in-
mates who were beating him. 1 Although the Court decided the case in
1963, the operative facts occurred prior to enactment of the Industries
Act amendment. 2 The Court held that the compensation system did not
preclude suit by prisoners under the Tort Claims Act.9"
At the outset of his opinion, Chief Justice Warren stated that the
Federal Tort Claims Act taken alone permitted federal prisoners to sue
the Government and declared that the act's intent was to remove the
burdensome load of private claims presented annually to Congress."4 He
added that congressional failure to exclude the prisoners from the act
indicated an intent to include them."5
The Government, on the other hand, contended that the Feres deci-
sion was controlling and thereby precluded the bringing of the suit.9" The
Court, however, interpreted Feres as holding that the mere presence of a
compensation system bars a cause of action. 7 Chief Justice Warren
listed the various factors considered in Feres9 and indicated that the
presence of the compensation system was not the controlling factor.9
The Muniz majority cited the "distinctly federal relationship" be-
tween the Government and servicemen as being the decisive feature in
Feres. °° Chief Justice Warren distinguished Feres from the factual con-
text of the Muniz case by holding that the "distinctly federal relation-
ship" did not exist between the Government and prison inmates."'
For purposes of this note, the significant portion of the Muniz deci-
sion is that concerning the Feres rule and its effect on remedial rights
under federal tort liability statutes. The Chief Justice cited United
States v. Brown..2 for the proposition that the presence of a compensation
90. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 152.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 153.
95. According to the Court, Congress passed a total of twenty-one private claim bills
for prisoners from 1935 to 1946. These bills are a substantial total if taken with regard to
the small percentage of private claim bills presented that were finally enacted.
96. 374 U.S. at 153.
97. Id. at 160.
98. See note 42 supra.
99. 374 U.S. at 160.
100. Id. at 162.
101. Id.
102. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
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system does not in every case bar suit for damages against the Govern-
ment."'3  He said:
Also, the compensation system in effect for prisoners in 1946
was not comprehensive. It provided compensation only for in-
juries incurred while engaged in prison industries. Neither
Winston nor Muniz would have been covered.10 '
The Munia court was not presented with and therefore did not deal
with the effect of the Prison Industries Act in cases in which the injured
party was actually within the act's provisions. Lower federal courts,
when presented with this question, have reached conflicting results." 5
Two of these recent decisions are Demko v. United States"0 6 and
Granada v. United States.
0 7
Granada concerned a prisoner injured while working on a public ad-
dress system in a federal penitentiary.' ° He applied for compensation
upon his discharge from prison, but in a separate administrative proceed-
ing, the Prison Industries Commission denied his claim on the grounds
that no disability remained which resulted from the injuries in question.'
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals treated the Feres rule as a well-
established rule of construction to which courts resort in an attempt to
reconcile "disparate types of statutory remedies.""'  The court, however,
apparently misstated the rule by saying that Feres stands for the proposi-
tion that the mere presence of a compensation system implies that it is
an exclusive remedy."' This misstatement is corrected in the remainder
of the opinion for the court examined the comprehensiveness of the com-
pensation system created by the Prison Industries Act."2  After saying
that the Feres rule is so well-established that the court would be inclined
to apply it without any logical basis being given for its existence,"' the
court asserted the policy of the rule."' To the Second Circuit, the pre-
103. Brown is one of the cases following the Brooks decision mentioned in note
47 supra. A factor not mentioned by the Court was that the Brown decision required
the plaintiff to pay back the compensation he had received, a condition not imposed by
the compensation act with which the Court was dealing.
104. 374 U.S. at 160.
105. See generally Nobels v. Federal Prison Indus., 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga.
1963) and Gomez v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 145 (D. Colo. 1965).
106. 350 F.2d 698 (3d Cir. 1965), rev'd, 87 Sup. Ct. 382 (1966).
107. 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1965).
108. Id. at 839.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 840.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 842.
113. Id. at 840.
114. Id. at 841.
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sumption of exclusiveness was merely a part of the quid pro quo.15
The Granada court interpreted the Muniz decision as being confined
to instances dealing with prisoners not covered by the compensation sys-
tem." 6  This, the court felt, precluded actual consideration of the Feres
rule of construction as followed in Johansen.7 and Patterson"' simply
because Muniz did not present the issue."'
Proceeding to a consideration of the compensation system, the court
noted that, because of the 1961 amendment, 2 ° its opinion of the Prison
Industries Act had changed."' The amendment increased the percentage
of inmates covered by the act."' The court noted that, although the act
itself merely permitted the creation of a system, various regulations had
in fact developed one."' The court said that the existence of a system
precluded the plaintiff's attack upon the act as vague and uncertain.'24
The Second Circuit also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the fact
that no compensation was paid while in prison and that payments after re-
lease were predicated on continuing disability made the system non-
comprehensive, 1 5 noting that during the period of convalescence, the
prisoners were paid as if they had been working and, therefore, suffered
no economic loss." 6  Also, if there were no further disability after re-
lease, no loss would be incurred, and if disability continued, the compen-
sation would be paid according to the schedules set up by the Employees
Compensation Act." 7
The Second Circuit concluded that the Prison Industries Act-in
fact comprehensive 82-placed the case under the requirements of Feres.
Applying the Feres rule, the court held that the plaintiff's suit was
barred."9
In Demko, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the same
problem but reached the opposite result. In that case the plaintiff, Demko,
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See notes 51-67 supra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 68-84 supra and accompanying text.
119. 356 F.2d at 842. Certiorari was granted in Muniz to decide the question of
whether the compensation act precluded suit by prisoners simply because of their status
without regard to the available coverage. None of the decisions that were mentioned
as being in conflict dealt with prisoners actually covered by the Industries Act. Id.
120. 356 F.2d at 842.
121. The Second Circuit considered both the Granada and Muniz cases.
122. See notes 85-89 supra and accompanying text.
123. 356 F.2d at 843.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 844.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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injured himself while working on prison maintenance.' The Prison
Industries Commission acted favorably upon his application for compen-
sation from the Prison Industries fund."' Demko then sued the Govern-
ment for negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act. 3 ' The
Government contended that the compensation was his exclusive remedy
against the United States.' 33 The Third Circuit rejected this contention
and permitted the suit under the Tort Claims Act. 4
The court believed that the statement of the Supreme Court calling
the Prison Industries Act a far less comprehensive system than the one
involved in the Feres case.35 was correct." 6 This fact, the Third Circuit
believed, dictated a holding adverse to the Government's contention.'
In support of its holding, the court analyzed the prisoner's compensation
system and found it to be less comprehensive than either the Veteran's
Act 3 ' or the Employees Compensation Act. 9 The court said:
If such compensation is intended to create either an election of
remedies or an obliteration of the remedy for tort, it is to be
expected that Congress will express such intention in the com-
pensation statute, especially if it does not establish a full and
comprehensive plan. 4 °
The Supreme Court on certiorari'4 ' resolved the conflict between
the Second and Third circuits by reversing the Third Circuit's decision
in Demko.'42 The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, held that
the Johansen principle rather than the Muniz decision was applicable to
suits by federal prisoners covered by the compensation system. 43
Mr. Justice Black stated that, historically, compensation statutes
were substitutes for, rather than supplements to, common-law tort lia-
130. 350 F.2d at 699.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 700.
134. Id. at 702.
135. The differences as found by the court were: 1) the Industries Act is permis-
sive rather than mandatory; 2) the amount of compensation given rests entirely upon
the discretion of the Attorney General; 3) the money is paid only at release and only if
disability continues; and 4) the right to the award never becomes vested but is always
conditioned upon continued lawful conduct by the injured.
136. 350 F.2d at 701.
137. Id. at 702.
138. Id.
139. See note 135 supra.
140. 350 F.2d at 700.
141. United States v. Demko, 87 Sup. Ct. 382 (1966).
142. Id. at 385.
143. Id. at 384.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1967], Art. 17
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol2/iss1/17
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
bility."' This "historic truth," the Court said, has been recognized by a
series of recent decisions which have established the general rule of the
exclusiveness of compensation system remedies. 45 The rule is that
"where there is a compensation statute that reasonably and fairly covers
a particular group of workers, it presumably is the exclusive remedy to
protect that group."' 46
The Court found no congressional purpose to make the Prison In-
dustries Act non-exclusive.'47 Mr. Justice Black rejected the plaintiff's
contention that the presumption of exclusiveness could not be applied to
the Industries Act because the act was not comprehensive. 4  He stated
that the benefits compared favorably with those of any other compensa-
tion statute and that any difference in protection afforded could be ex-
plained by the peculiar circumstances of prisoners.'4 9
Finally, the Court disposed of the argument that the decision in
Muniz 50 dictated a contrary holding.' Mr. Justice Black stated that the
situation in Muniz was clearly distinguishable from the facts in
Demko.' 5' The prisoners in Muniz were not afforded the protection of
the compensation statute while the plaintiff in Demko did have this pro-
tection. 5 '
The Feres test, as originally propounded, stated that a compensation
act was to be fit into the entire system of remedies to make an "equitable
whole."' 54  The Supreme Court clarified this further in Johansen.5 and
Patterson5 by declaring a presumption of exclusiveness when the com-
pensation act was "comprehensive." '  In Demko, the Supreme Court
seems to have further modified the test by stating that the presumption
of exclusiveness arises from history and is applicable where the compen-
sation statute "reasonably and fairly" covers the particular group of
workers.' Though the words of the test are different, the effect is not.
In personal injury suits against the Government, the claimant will be
barred from attempting to increase his total recovery by civil action
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See notes 125-27 supra and accompanying text.
150. See notes 90-104 supra and accompanying text.
151. 87 Sup. Ct. at 385.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See notes 39-47 supra and accompanying text.
155. See notes 48-67 supra and accompanying text.
156. See notes 68-84 supra and accompanying text.
157. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
158. See note 146 supra and accompanying text.
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against the United States if he is covered by a compensation act which
provides fair and adequate benefits, regardless of whether the compen-
sation statute expressly provides that the compensation remedy is to be
exclusive. 5 '
ELECTION OF REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
COMPENSATION ACT
The Federal Control Act of 19181"' placed control of the railroads in
the hands of the Government.' 6 ' This same act provided that suits which
would have been brought against the railroads would, for the duration of
the Control Act, lie solely against the Government through the Director
General of Railroads.L
6 2
Prior to adoption of the Control Act, it was possible for a federal
employee to collect compensation under the Compensation Act and sue the
railroads for damages."' By virtue of sections 7761 and 77765 of the
Compensation Act, part of the recovery that the employee received from
his common-law suit would be used to reimburse the United States for
the compensation which it had awarded or would subsequently award
him."6 6 Thus, in a proper case, the employee had an absolute right to re-
ceive compensation and an opportunity to increase his recovery through
a suit against the tort-feasor railroad." 7
The adoption of the Control Act, by removing responsibility from
the railroads and placing it upon the Government, raised the issue of
whether the employee injured by the railroads retained the opportunity
to increase his recovery through a suit at common law. 66 Since the Com-
pensation Act had not been expressly made exclusive, there appeared to
be no explicit congressional dictate barring suit under the Control Act
after a recovery under the Compensation Act.' The Supreme Court,
159. Id.
160. Federal Control Act, 40 Stat. 451 (1918).
161. Id. § 10.
162. Id.
163. See notes 191-204 infra and accompanying text.
164. 5 U.S.C. § 776 (1964). See notes 194-96 infra and accompanying text.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 777 (1964). See notes 197-200 infra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 201-204 infra and accompanying text.
167. Sections 776 and 777 as discussed in notes 191-204 infra were present in the
same form at the time of the adoption of the Control Act.
168. See generally 31 Op. ATT'x GEN. 365 (1918), wherein the Attorney General
rejects the contention that the Commission's right to require assignment of the injured
employee's claim against a third party is defeated where the United States is the party
ultimately responsible. The purpose of this requirement is to insure that the compen-
sation remedy is used only to the extent that compensation is not available from "other
sources."
169. Id.
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however, in Dahn v. Davis,170 held that the Control Act did not permit
the injured federal employee to collect compensation and sue the Govern-
ment.1 7' Rather, the employee must elect one remedy and lose the
other.17
2
In Dahn, a postal employee was injured in the course of his employ-
ment while the railroads were being operated by the Director General. 73
The employee received compensation under the Compensation Act.174 Sub-
sequently, he initiated an action against the Director General under the
provisions of the Control Act.' The Supreme Court, noting that the
provisions of the Control Act apparently gave a federal employee two
remedies for one injury, held that the decision turned on whether the
"petitioner, having pursued one of his remedies to a conclusion and pay-
ment, may pursue the other for a second satisfaction of the same wrong
against the Government ? ' ' 176 Relying upon various provisions of the
Compensation Act, 77 the Court held that the petitioner could not, de-
claring that the Compensation Act was intended to afford "full and fi-
nal" payment.'
In support of the holding that the payment of compensation formed
an election of remedies barring further suit, the Court stated:
The Compensation Act deals with, and confers rights only up-
on, employees of the Government, who must be but a small
percentage of those authorized to sue under the Federal Control
Act, and it is impossible for us to conclude that Congress in-
tended by the enactment of the latter law to allow an employee
to claim and receive the compensation specially provided for
him under the former and then, while enjoying the benefit,
to institute suit against the Government under the Federal Con-
trol Act, which might require it to make further payment for
the same injury and which must, in all cases subject it to ex-
pensive, harrassing and often long protracted litigation.'
The election-of-remedies solution as pronounced by the Dahn case
was used prior to the Feres decision and prior to adoption of the "exclu-
170. 258 U.S. 421 (1922).
171. Id. at 427.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 258 U.S. at 428.
176. Id.
177. The Court mentioned section 7 (5 U.S.C. § 757(a)), section 26 (5 U.S.C. §
776) and section 27 (5 U.S.C. § 777).
178. 258 U.S. at 432.
179. Id.
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sive" provision of the Compensation Act."' It should be noted that this
election solution differs from the solution adopted in the Green case.""
The election-of-remedies theory would allow a federal employee injured
in a motor vehicle accident to sue the Government only if the employee
elected to reject the compensation due him under the Compensation Act.
The election-of-remedies solution has not been used in reported cases in-
volving the Employees Compensation Act following the adoption of the
"exclusive" provision which has been held to remove the election.8 2
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ACT
The courts consider the Compensation Act a "comprehensive sys-
tem to award payments for injuries."'' The benefits provided for in-
jured federal employees are, in general, greater than the benefits avail-
able under any comparable compensation system.184 Furthermore, the
awards and payment are made to the employee within an exceptionally
short time period, thereby eliminating many of the hardships inherent in
the long waiting period that accompanies a common-law recovery.8 5
The 1966 amendment to the Compensation Act'86 made substantial
increases in the size of the benefits available. As presently formulated,
the Compensation Act provides benefits that have been deemed "fan-
tastic." '87  The maximum rate is now $1,400.00 per month'88 while the
minimum is $56.00 per month.'8 9 The rates are adjusted according to
increases in the price index. 9 '
The Compensation Act contains express provisions dealing with ac-
cidents involving a potential liability of a party "other than the United
States."'' The applicable sections of the act are sections 77612 and
180. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
181. See note 15 supra.
182. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
183. Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427, 430 (1951).
184. Interview with Assistant District Director of the Bureau of Employees Com-
pensation, Middle-West District, in Chicago, Ill., Oct. 11, 1966.
185. Id.
186. Federal Employees Compensation Act Amendments of 1966, 80 Stat. 252
(1966).
187. Interview, supra note 184.
188. 80 Stat. 252, § 3(b) (1966).
189. Id.
190. 80 Stat. 252, § 14 (1966).
191. For interpretation of the reasons for the inclusion of this clause see note 168
supra.
192. If a third party other than the United States is liable for the injury through
which the employee claims compensation:
[T]he commission may require the beneficiary to assign to the United States
any right of action he may have . . . or the commission may require said
beneficiary to prosecute said action in his own name.
If the beneficiary shall refuse to make such assignment or to prosecute said
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777.18
Section 776 deals with the situation in which a third party may be
liable to the employee but the employee has brought no action against the
third party.194 This section provides that the Commission may require
the employee to assign his right of action against the third party to the
United States, or that the Commission may require the employee to prose-
cute the action in his own name.19 Failure of the employee to comply
with such requirement results in forfeiture of his claim under the Com-
pensation Act."'
Section 777 concerns situations in which the employee receives re-
muneration from the third party. 9 ' In effect, section 777 prior to 1966
required that any amount received from the third party be used to repay
the compensation awarded by the Government." 8
Section 777 also makes provisions for the distribution of any money
received from the third party prior to an award of compensation. 9 In
such instances, the money is credited against any subsequent compensa-
tion claim based upon the same injury."'
The above-mentioned sections of the Compensation Act preclude an
injured federal employee from retaining two recoveries for one injury.
For clarification, assume that X, a federal employee, is injured by Y. X
receives $5,000.00 under the Compensation Act.°0  If X receives
$4,000.00 from his claim against Y, X will be required to pay the entire
$4,000.00 to the Government and he is, therefore, left solely with the
amount of the Compensation Act award.' °' If X receives $6,000.00 from
action . . . he shall not be entitled to any compensation under this chapter.
5 U.S.C. § 776 (1964).
193. Where a party has received payment from a third party, he shall after deduct-
ing his reasonable expenses for an attorney and cost of the suit apply money so received
in the following manner:
(A). If compensation has been paid in whole or in part, he shall refund to the
United States the amount of compensation which has been paid by the
United States and credit any surplus upon future payments of compen-
sation payable to him on account of the same injury.
(B). If no compensation has been paid to him by the United States he shall
credit the money or other property so received upon any compensation
payable to him by the United States on account of the same injury.
5 U.S.C. § 777 (1964).
194. 5 U.S.C. § 776 (1964).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 5 U.S.C. § 777 (1964).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The distribution of money received from a third party is substantially the
same whether the compensation has been paid by the Government before or after the
recovery against the third party.
202. See note 192 supra and accompanying text.
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Y, the Government is entitled to $5,000.002"  and X is left with the
amount of his recovery from Y." 0' The total effect is to leave X with the
greater of the two awards.
The procedure created by sections 776 and 777 is not merely the-
oretical but is used by the Government in situations in which there exists
a possibility of third-party liability." 5 In such situations, the Bureau of
Employees Compensation submits a report to a special legal division
which deals with third-party liability cases.2"8 If a probability of re-
covery exists, the Bureau acts to assert its "subrogation" rights." 7
The 1966 amendment to the Compensation Act, in addition to in-
creasing the available benefits, 0 8 alters the method of distribution of re-
coveries made from a third party.20 9 Under section 776 and 777(A) the
injured employee is now allowed to retain one-fifth of the recovery
against the third party.210 The change was intended to induce juries to
award higher recoveries when the Government is the real party in in-
terest.2"1  Also, Congress believed that the change would compensate em-
ployees who were required by the Commission to prosecute the action for
their time and trouble.2
12
The amendment does not indicate whether Congress considered the
Compensation Act to be inadequate. Congress restricted its changes to
the sections dealing with suits that were not voluntarily prosecuted by
the injured employee.21 Allowing the employee to retain a percentage
of the recovery is akin to payment for services rendered-the services be-
ing the reduction of the Government's expenses.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it is suggested that courts should not allow a federal
employee whose injury is compensable under the terms of the Compensa-
203. See note 193 supra.
204. See notes 160-83 stupra and accompanying text.
205. Interview with Assistant District Director of the Bureau of Employees Com-
pensation, Middle-West District in Chicago, Ill., Oct. 11, 1966.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See notes 183-90 supra and accompanying text.
209. Federal Employees Compensation Act Amendments, 80 Stat. 252 (1966).
210. These sections were amended by the addition of the following phrase:
Provided, that in any event the beneficiary shall be paid not less than one-fifth
of the net amount of any settlement or recovery remaining after the expenses
thereof have been deducted.
Federal Employees Compensation Act Amendments, § 10, 80 Stat. 252 (1966).
211. 112 CONG. REc. 4813 (1966) (remarks of Mr. O'Hara).
212. Id.
213. Note that the section dealing with distribution of proceeds from recovery
prior to the award of compensation does not provide for the one-fifth guarantee. See
Federal Employees Compensation Act Amendments, § 10, 80 Stat. 252 (1966).
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tion Act to prosecute a suit under section 2679 of the Tort Claims Act.
The Compensation Act expressly provides that it is to be the exclusive
remedy of the injured employee against the United States.21 This "ex-
clusive" provision is indicative of congressional intent to have the bene-
fits available under the Compensation Act treated as full payment by the
United States for the injuries incurred by a federal employee, regardless
of the creation of an apparent second remedy by general tort liability
statutes.21
In sum, the Supreme Court on numerous occasions has implied an
exclusive character to compensation acts where no express "exclusive"
provision has been adopted.21 The test used on these occasions has been
whether the compensation fairly and adequately protects the class of
plaintiffs whose remedy is to be considered exclusive.217
That federal employees who operate motor vehicles had, prior to
adoption of section 2679, a right to institute suit against the tort-feasor
should not be taken to defeat the clear wording of the "exclusive" pro-
vision of the Compensation Act. The injured employee's right to sue
the third party is restricted by "subrogation" rights which the United
States claims in the recovery.' Therefore, removing the injured em-
ployee's right to bring a civil suit will leave him with rights that are in-
ferior to those of other employees only to the degree that a civil recovery
would exceed the compensation award.21 '
Even if the Compensation Act is not considered to be exclusive, the
courts should not allow the injured employee to collect compensation and
sue the Government. The situation is similar to that created by the Fed-
eral Control Act, where the Supreme Court required an injured employee
to elect between his remedy under the Control Act and his remedy under
the Compensation Act.2"' It is suggested that, at a minimum, a federal
employee injured by a co-employee under facts falling within section
2679 should be required to make this same election.
214. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
215. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 39-159 supra and accompanying text.
217. See notes 154-59 supra and accompanying text.
218. See notes 191-213 supra and accompanying text.
219. Id.
220. See notes 160-82 supra and accompanying text.
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